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Transnational Legal Pluralism 
Peer Zumbansen* 
 
Abstract 
This paper draws out the analogies and connections between long-standing legal sociological 
insights into pluralistic legal orders and present concerns regarding the fragmentation of law outside of 
the nation state. Within the nation state, the discovery of legal pluralism inspired a larger 
contestation of concepts of legal formalism, of the alleged unity of the legal order and of the 
hierarchy of norms against the background of a constantly advancing process of 
constitutionalisation. This research heightened regulators’ sensitivity to blind spots and exclusionary 
dynamics in the design of rights, leading inter alia to wide-ranging efforts to render more effective 
access to justice, legal aid and legal representation. Another important consequence concerned an 
increased awareness of different levels and sites of norm creation in various societal areas. Much of 
this is mirrored by today’s quest for a just, democratic and equitable global legal order, for 
example in debates about ‘fragmentation of international law’ or ‘global administrative law’. But, 
while the legal pluralism debate largely unfolded in the context (and contestation) of relatively mature 
legal orders and institutions, such institutional frameworks and safeguards are largely absent on 
the international plane. As a result, the emergence of numerous norm-setting agencies, 
specialised courts and tribunals and regulatory networks are perceived as obstacles or 
impediments to the creation of a sound legal order on a global scale, rather than as inherent traits of 
an evolving legal order. 
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 In order to grasp the increasingly transterritorial nature of regulatory governance 
it is necessary to revisit the arguments in support of legal pluralism and, in particular, 
the legal pluralist critique of the association of law with the state. On that basis, it 
becomes possible to read the currently dominant narrative of the ‘end of law’ in an 
era of globalisation in a different light. Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as 
an end-point of legal development, the transnational perspective seeks to deconstruct the 
various law-state associations by understanding the evolution of law in relation and 
response to the development of ‘world society’. The currently lamented lack of democratic 
accountability, say, in international economic governance, can then be perceived as a 
further consequence in a highly differentiated and de-territorialised society. The paper 
thus rejects attempts by lawyers to realign transnational governance actors with traditional 
concepts of the state or of civil society, and instead contrasts them with various advances in 
sociology and anthropology with regard to the evolution of ‘social norms’ and ‘spaces’ of 
governance and regulation. These perspectives effectively challenge present attempts to 
conceptualise a hierarchically structured global legal order. This article’s proposed concept of 
‘transnational legal pluralism’ goes beyond Philip Jessup’s 1956 idea of ‘transnational 
law’, through which he sought to both complement and challenge Public and Private 
International Law. Transnational legal pluralism brings together insights from legal 
sociology and legal theory with research on global justice, ethics and regulatory 
governance to illustrate the transnational nature of law and regulation, always pushing 
against the various claims to legal unity and hierarchy made over time. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the distinctive features of today’s legal theoretical work on global governance is the 
recurring frustration with and problematisation of the absence of stable institutions of 
norm creation and enforcement outside of the nation state. While the discrepancy 
between the weight and urgency of border-crossing regulatory challenges—such as climate 
change, migration and security on the one hand and the existing institutional and 
normative framework on the other—arguably lies at the bottom of this malcontent, global 
governance must address other concerns as well. One such concern has to do with the 
ambiguity of the concept and the term depicting it. ‘Global’ ‘governance’ alludes to two 
transformations, namely a shift from government to governance and a counting of time 
‘before’ and ‘after’ globalisation. Approaching global governance from this starting point, 
however, carries particular risks of juxtaposing inadequately depicted states and 
constellations of legal and political order. 
Related narratives are often informed by accounts of globalisation as marking a 
moment of loss of something that was there before. As will be discussed in more detail 
later, this demarcation of before and after inappropriately idealises and petrifies the before 
but also limits the range of institutional and normative imagination applicable to the 
after. This has significant consequences, for example, when we are confronted with the 
alleged loss of legal ‘unity’, ‘certainty’ or ‘hierarchy’ in the global arena as opposed to the 
nation state, which in turn is celebrated as an ideal space that now has become lost (or at 
least, radically undermined or diminished) and, thus, ill-suited to the demands of a 
globalised world. The distinction between the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ of globalisation also 
has a tremendous impact on the normative evaluation of what was and what is to come, 
something that has become extremely important for the critique of colonialism and 
so-called post-colonialism1 and which, in turn, has been a crucial source of critical 
 scholarship in international law.2 
From a different angle, global governance raises serious concerns among critical legal 
scholars, who understandably fear the fast emergence and consolidation of an 
allencompassing regulatory framework that is driven more by alleged needs to ‘react’, to 
‘monitor’, to ‘facilitate’ and to ‘moderate’ global activity than by a continued engagement 
with a political theory of law in a pluralistic and divided world. Where ‘good governance’ 
then turns into a label and a meta-theoretical justification for ongoing processes of 
economic globalisation, alternative proposals, geared towards renewed critiques of property3 
and human rights4 and towards the development of empowering, pluralistic transnational 
communities5 and forums,6 face serious obstacles. 
In light of these complexities of overlapping and conflicting accounts, the disciplinary 
field of global governance offers an important opportunity to gain new and further 
insights into the building blocks of an emerging legal, political and economic order. The 
struggle with the absence of ‘world government’ is undeniably a struggle—over the form 
and legitimacy of—any—government itself. As such, current inquiries into the role of the 
state and the nature of legal regulation are charged with the translation of an 
extremely rich repository of rights critique, ‘law and society’ scholarship, ‘law and 
economics’ analysis, and legal anthropology into the discourses unfolding under the 
umbrella of an interdisciplinary study of transnational regulatory regimes. Such a research 
agenda develops against the background of the ‘anti-positivist’ origins of legal pluralism,7 
which eventually evolved into a highly differentiated and empirically driven analysis of co-
existing and overlapping regulatory regimes.8 The emergence of ‘governance studies’9 and 
the increasingly influential study of law through a regulatory lens10 testify to an 
important widening and deepening of the legal analytical apparatus. Seen in this light, the 
 present obsession with the alleged novelty of a ‘global’ legal and political order has direct 
ties to preceding contestations of welfare state governments and their aftermaths in the last 
two decades, including a significant functionalisation of regulatory policies and legal 
principles.11 Accordingly, much needed inquiries into previous experiences with rights 
regimes are fuelled by grave concerns over democratic representation12 but remain torn 
between references to state-to-state relations and a concern with global ‘citizens’,13 as well as 
over the politics of (domestic) hard and (global) soft laws14 and the nature of rights15 on a 
global scale.16 Finally, the competing assertions of market regulation, before and since the 
unfolding of the global financial and economic crisis that began in 2007,17 call for a 
renewed assessment of the legal nature of markets, long ago scrutinised by Legal Realist 
scholars,18 as well as of the particular forms of legal and non-legal regulation that remain at 
the centre of ‘law and society’19 scholarship and studies of ‘legal pluralism’.20 What has 
become increasingly recognised is the fact that such inquiry cannot remain confined to a 
discipline or field on its own: branches of economics as well as a wide range of ‘social 
sciences’ have been called upon to contribute to the emergence of a more layered and more 
differentiated concept of ‘regulatory governance’.21 
In light of these preliminary observations, the paper aims to draw out the analogies and 
connections between long-standing legal sociological insights into pluralistic legal orders 
and present concerns with the ‘fragmentation’ of law outside of the nation state to show 
that the focus on law ‘before’ and ‘after’ globalisation misses the point. In the context of 
the nation state and well before the before/after-globalisation optic took hold, legal 
pluralism had contributed to a fundamental contestation of legal formalism and of the 
alleged unity and hierarchical structure of the nation state legal order. This research 
heightened regulators’ sensitivity to blind spots and exclusionary dynamics in the design of 
 
 rights, leading inter alia to wide-ranging efforts to render more effective access to 
justice, legal aid and legal representation.22 Another important consequence of legal 
pluralist research concerned an increased awareness of different levels and sites of norm 
creation,23 work that remains among the central catalysts for a fast-growing body of 
regulatory theory literature in law in present times. The ideological battles waged over the 
basis and limits of rights, over redistribution and over democratic participation naturally 
cross the boundaries of nation states—in both directions.24 Much of this is mirrored by 
today’s quest for a just, democratic and equitable global legal order as reflected, for 
example, in the debate about the ‘fragmentation of international law’25 or the 
aspirations—and limitations—of a ‘global administrative law’.26 But, while the legal 
pluralism debate had a strong impact in the context and through the contestation of 
relatively mature legal orders and institutions,27 such institutional frameworks and 
safeguards are largely absent on the international plane. Accordingly, the emergence of 
numerous norm-setting agencies, specialised courts and tribunals and regulatory networks 
can be perceived either as obstacles or impediments to the creation of a sound legal order 
on a global scale or as inherent traits of an evolving legal order.28 
In order to grasp the increasingly transterritorial nature of regulatory governance, it is 
necessary to revisit the arguments in support of legal pluralism and, in particular, the 
legal pluralist critique of law’s association with the state. On that basis, it becomes possible 
to read the currently dominant narrative of the ‘end of law’ in an era of globalisation in a 
different light. Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as an end-point of 
legal development, a transnational perspective seeks to deconstruct the various law-state 
associations by understanding the evolution of law in relation and response to the 
development of ‘world society’, a society understood as non-territorially confined, 
 
 functionally differentiated and constituted by the co-evolution of conflicting societal 
rationalities. The decisive feature of world society is the impossibility of devising one 
convincing meta-theory of political governance.29 Instead, its contours only become 
apparent through an incessant confrontation of particular, functionally differentiated 
rationalities with a concept of society that remains embedded in a dualist conception of 
public and private, state and market. On that basis, the lack of democratic accountability, 
say, in international economic governance,30 can then be perceived as lying squarely 
between the further accentuated evolution of a highly differentiated and de-territorialised 
society on the one hand and a continued quest for (global) justice on the other. This 
suggests a certain scepticism towards attempts to realign transnational governance actors 
with traditional concepts of the state or of civil society. In contrast, a more promising 
avenue of inquiry seems to involve a study of the evolving actors and norms on the basis of 
advances made in sociology and anthropology with regard to the evolution of ‘social 
norms’ and ‘spaces’ of governance and regulation,31 but also the concept of ‘economic 
governance’ developed in the context of the ‘New Institutional Economics’.32 
Against this background, this paper seeks to combine a legal sociological perspective 
with a legal theoretical one for a critical reconstruction of ‘legal pluralism’ against the 
background of the concept of transnational law, with the aim of developing a concept of 
‘transnational legal pluralism’. It attempts to build bridges between, on the one hand, the 
long-standing introspection into ‘law and its other’ that has taken place with reference to 
political institutions and processes, to the state and a legitimating societal body, and, on 
the other hand, the still less known and less travelled global space. The concept of 
transnational legal pluralism to be developed in this article goes beyond Philip Jessup’s 
1956 idea of ‘transnational law’, through which he sought both to complement and to 
 challenge Public and Private International Law,33 by bringing together insights from legal 
sociology and legal theory with research on global justice, ethics and regulatory 
governance to illustrate (what he coined as) the transnational nature of law and regulation, 
always pushing against the various claims to legal unity and hierarchy made over time. 
While for Jessup the reference to ‘transnational’ served above all to highlight the inability 
of the existing disciplines of both public and private international law to capture the 
various border-crossing regulatory interactions between public and private or between 
private parties, the here-proposed concept of transnational legal pluralism is first and 
foremost a proposal to conceive of transnational law from a methodological perspective. 
It is thus no longer concerned with a quest for a legal field, which could embrace and 
regulate the just described border-crossing nature of hybrid regulatory interaction. 
Instead, the term transnational is meant here to identify a methodological space in 
which to make sense of the conditions that shape references to law or non-law in 
functionally highly differentiated contexts. 
These contexts—such as financial markets,34 online sales contracts35 and labour 
regulations in and around multinational enterprises36—are characterised by a complex 
amalgamation of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, direct and indirect norms that no longer fit under the 
semantic umbrella of existing disciplinary fields such as labour law or corporate law. As a 
result, not only have the scope and content of such fields come under pressure; more 
importantly, the intersection of different forms of ‘regulatory governance’ with regard to 
such contexts must now be assessed through a methodological lens. From this perspective, 
then, the first insight is into the distinctly interdisciplinary nature of the regulation that 
marks a particular context. We see here an intricate co-existence, with overlap and often 
competition between legal and, say, economic rules.37 
 
 The further insight, of crucial importance from a legal theory point of view, is into the 
status of law in this mixed regulatory landscape, and it is here that a concept of 
transnational legal pluralism must reach beyond Jessup’s identification of a particular 
exhaustion of existing disciplinary fields to depict border-crossing, hybrid interaction. 
The central point of the transnational perspective embraced here is that, despite an 
emerging consensus regarding the co-existence of legal and ‘other’ forms of regulation, an 
observation informed above all by the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
institutions in the context of New Institutional Economics,38 we are still at a loss as to 
how to distinguish between a legal and a non-legal form of regulation. As long as the 
distinction is based on the reference to a particular authority, which alone is entrusted 
with the production of legal rules—commonly understood to be the state—the 
distinction will result in an identification of ‘formal’ institutions with ‘law’ and the state, 
while almost every other norm apt to govern or guide human behaviour can only be 
considered as ‘informal’. What is left outside of this demarcation is the question of ‘What is 
at stake?’ in the choice between a legal and an alternative form of regulation. 
For lawyers, this remains extremely unsatisfactory, because the distinction can only be 
sustained in blunt negation of the far-reaching legal pluralist insights into the many forms 
of legal normative orders. As a result, because lawyers are bound to remain troubled by the 
economists’ demarcation of formal versus informal, an important step towards a more 
adequate assessment of the regulatory pluralism characterising the abovementioned contexts 
is to place a central emphasis on how the distinction between law and non-law is in fact 
made. It is here that lawyers are likely to unfold a different set of distinctions from that which 
has been informing the economist’s study of institutions. While the economist is herself 
pushing ever deeper into the ‘institutional diversity’ that marks complex regulatory 
 and self-regulatory contexts,39 the gained insights remain confined to an (admittedly 
better) understanding of the various rules, norms and behaviour-governing institutions 
present in such contexts. Meanwhile, the process through which the distinction 
between the legal and a non-legal character of any such institution is made remains 
opaque, as long as the distinction is loosely attached to references to state-based or non-
state-based norm-making authorities. Against the background of legal pluralist insights 
into the different forms of legal regulation, based on which formal legal systems were being 
put to the test in terms of their legitimacy, their openness to change and their responsivity to 
social pressure,40 such a narrow interpretation of law cannot stand. 
Central to the project of transnational legal pluralism are, thus, the following two 
methodological premises. The first concerns the inquiry into the elements that inform the 
distinction between law and non-law in any given regulatory context. Precisely because 
‘alternatives’ to legal regulation have become impressively self-assured in asserting their 
interpretive and governing grip on complex constellations,41 it is even more important to 
ask whether there is in fact any role left for law and, in particular, for law’s operation to 
introduce the distinction between legal and illegal with regard to a social context.42 The 
role of law, as will be developed in more detail below, remains in facilitating and 
structuring the space in which trade-offs between legal and non-legal regulations occur. 
This structuring of law is bound to function with references to the learned contexts and 
institutional frameworks associated with law in a given place at a given time, which 
explains a certain preoccupation among continental European lawyers with the allegedly 
central role of the ‘state’ in the creation and enforcement of legal rules. At the same time, 
the comparative assessment of the binding or mandatory character of law, even in areas of 
intense market regulation and self-regulation such as corporate law, already reveals 
 striking differences in the perception of what is and is not necessary in order to achieve an 
adequate level of ordered conduct.43 
The second methodological premise concerns the transnational dimension in the 
legal pluralist analysis, which is proposed here. ‘Transnational’ demarcates not a 
territorially defined and demarcated space, across the boundaries of which regulations are 
seen to be either successful or unsuccessful in governing or prescribing behaviour. Rather, the 
term depicts the space in which the legal pluralist analysis of legal and non-legal 
regulation occurs. It makes reference to the space that is left empty between 
conceptualisations of a legal order from either a ‘national’ or ‘international’ perspective. 
The term ‘transnational’ is closely connected to the sociological model of the ‘world 
society’, a term that radicalises the idea of functional differentiation and traces 
communications (in law, economics, religion, politics) primarily with reference to the 
particular rationalities of such systems. ‘Primarily’, because any system-theoretical 
assessment is likely to continue, for some time to come, to incorporate references to the 
‘context’ in which systematic communications occur. From the vantage point of much of 
Western legal theory, this context is predominantly the state and, more particularly, the 
nation state. However, from the perspective of transnational legal pluralism, while this 
context may still be referenced merely to better trace the evolution of a particular system 
over time, it does not in itself explain or capture a particular system. In other words, the 
‘transnational’ element in transnational legal pluralism seeks to capture this transition 
process in legal theory from a state-based depiction and interpretation of legal norms to a 
conceptualisation of legal norm creation that unfolds according to principles of functional 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section (2) revisits the legal 
 pluralist insights into what is a paradoxical relation between law and non-law. Against this 
background, the paper traces the emergence of border-crossing regulatory regimes as a 
challenge to state-oriented legal reasoning (section 3) before illustrating the parallels between 
the impasses of legal theorising about ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ governance with those that 
marked the evolution of the study of law in the nation state. Section 4 revisits the frequently 
asked question whether globalisation marks the end of law: attempting a negative answer 
(‘law is dead—long live law!’), this section proposes to read the emergence of 
‘transnational law’ not as the advent of a ‘new’ field—similar to the way that, say, 
environmental law and internet law were once considered novel fields only relatively 
recently. Instead, as pointed out above, the central assumption is that transnational law 
constitutes a methodological perspective, or paradigm shift in legal theory—an attempt 
to bridge the experience of legal pluralism in the nation state with that of the functionally 
differentiated world society, that Jessup still sought to capture with reference to an 
emerging transnational space. Section 5 pursues this argument and applies it to the initial 
paradox between law and non-law. Transnational law can now be understood as a lens 
through which to perceive the argumentative parallels between the impasses, roadblocks and 
‘impossibilities’ of law that recur both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the nation state. As the 
borders of the state are reconstructed as historically contingent reference points for the 
evolution of legal reasoning, transnational law becomes the legal theoretical reconstruction of 
law/non-law in the world society. The concluding section (6) sets out the framework of 
transnational legal pluralism. 
 
2. LAW AND ITS OTHER 
 
 Today, many regulatory areas can only be understood as instantiations of global norm 
creation. Supply chains that tie regional and global markets together,44 commercial 
arbitration,45 food safety and food quality standardisation regimes,46 internet 
governance,47 but also environmental protection,48 crime49 and terrorism50 are key 
examples of fast expanding spaces of individual, organisational and regulatory activity 
that evolve with little regard for jurisdictional boundaries but, instead, appear to develop 
according to functional imperatives. Similarly, fields such as corporate, insolvency and 
even labour law that had long been understood as embedded in historically evolved 
political and regulatory economies,51  today display a distinctly de-nationalised 
character,52 which we should approach from the distinct methodological perspective 
indicated above. Constituted through a complex overlapping of different national, 
international, public and private norm-creation processes, these fields underscore the 
conundrical nature of a proliferating and expanding global regulatory space: in response, 
state-based responses that draw on architectures of normative hierarchy, separation of 
powers and unity of law53 are likely to fall short of grasping the nature of the evolving 
transnational normative order.54 
In their search for appropriate labels, concepts and instruments for this regulatory 
space, lawyers have long been forming alliances with scholars in a wide range of social 
sciences including sociology, political science, economics and geography.55 Such 
interdisciplinary collaboration in practice and methodology is anything but new to law 
and legal theory: building as it does on early beginnings established by social scientists that 
emphasised the importance of social facts and increasingly incorporated empirical 
findings,56 the study of law has for the longest time been carried out in close proximity 
and in the constant shadow of social studies.57 The legal sociological projects at the end of 
 the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century58 can today be seen as 
eminent precursors to a presently further intensifying study of the institutional foundations of 
legal systems in a constellation marked by the erosion of boundaries between domestic 
legal orders and the continuing contestation of the normativeconceptual foundations of the 
rule of law as well as the welfare state and its ambiguous aftermath.59 The Legal Realist 
attack on formalism,60 the post-War natural law/legal positivism debate,61 the emergence 
of a particular strand of legal pluralism in the wake of post-colonialism,62 the rise of 
‘law and society’—both from the left63 and from the right64—as well as the critique of 
juridifications65 have since given way to a cacophonic contestation of the merits and limits of 
‘law’s knowledge’, its evolving nature and role.66 Seen in this light, the search for the 
‘nature of law’ has always been carried out on the pretentious assumption that it is or must 
be different, that law is—or, in the end can be— different from religion, morality and 
economics.67 But the short twentieth century has left this idea of law battered and torn, 
scarred and violated.68 Any attempt, then, to resurrect this assumption must be perceived as 
either naive or incredulously courageous. As depicted in Table 1 opposite, the following 
definitions of or approaches to law come to mind: law as a means of oppression, of 
corruption and domination, or law as a promise of hope, as an instrument of liberation 
and emancipation. Its schizophrenic character is owed to its paradoxical foundation,69 the 
impossibility of its legitimate creation out of a void,70 out of one or more acts of 
violence.71 Historically, as law differentiates and emancipates itself from politics, 
economics, religion, not in order to ‘rise above’ but, rather, to immerse and embrace 
and to juridify society in its inexhaustible complexity,72 it threatens either to suffer the fate 
of Icarus or to evaporate into thin air. Its immodest, impossible claim must be to be outside 
of society (politics, economics, religion), but at the same time to be (the law of) society.73 
 Rather than attempting to define law in a purely conceptual space, we ought to approach it 
by looking at the way that it distinguishes itself from alternative programs of order. This 
should, then, be the starting point for understanding the nature of law, rather than an earth-
shattering revelation after a seminar in deconstruction. Law’s other is, thus, deeply inherent in 
any program of law and in law’s lurking denial, ridiculisation and (self-) destruction. 
The difficulty in understanding law has to be seen against the background of a 
blurring of boundaries between ‘law’ and ‘society’.74 As pointed out by Roger Cotterrell, 
 
Table 1: Definitions of Law 
 
1 Law as an institutionalised system of rule enforcement 
2 Law as a means of stabilising expectations 
3 Law as a means of oppression 
4 Law as hope 
5 Law as a parasite—without method, heart or soul …? 
 
 
‘[l]aw constitutes society in so far as it is, itself, an aspect of society, a framework and an 
expression of understandings that enable society to exist. A sociological perspective on 
legal ideas is necessary to recognise and analyse the intellectual and moral power of law in 
this respect.’75 Understanding law, then, as a ‘social phenomenon’,76 Cotterrell observes that 
the distinction between law and society does indeed blur: the internal/external 
distinction is ‘replaced by a conception of partial, relatively narrow or specialised 
participant perspectives on (and in) law, confronting and being confronted by, 
penetrating, illuminating, and being penetrated and illuminated by, broader, more 
 inclusive perspectives on (and in) law as a social phenomenon’.77 He rightly posits that 
the ‘[s]ociological interpretation of legal ideas is not a particular, specialized way of 
approaching law, merely co-existing with other kinds of understanding. Sociology of law in 
this particular context is a transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden 
understanding of law as a social phenomenon.’78 Such a perspective on law must be 
understood as an attempt to respond to law’s own lack of methodology: ‘Law does not 
have a “methodology of its own” and borrows methodologies from any discipline that can 
supply them.’79 He concludes that a sociological reflection on legal ideas would be to 
reflect ‘methodologically law’s own fragmentary varied methodological characteristics’.80 
 
3. THE TRANSNATIONALISATION OF LEGAL GOVERNANCE 
 
A. Law’s Utopia 
As the shifting of our analytical focus beyond the boundaries of the nation state has been 
providing the stage for the study of law in the recent past,81 the framework of 
transnational legal pluralism proposed here82 seeks to capture the methodological 
challenge arising for law and social theory to make sense of the emerging normative order of 
the world society. In situating this concept in dialogue with theoretical approaches 
regarding ‘transnational law’,83 ‘transnational commercial law’,84 ‘global law’,85 ‘law and 
globalisation’,86 ‘transnational spaces’87 and ‘communities’,88 ‘global legal pluralism’,89 
‘hard versus soft law’,90 ‘law and social norms’91 or ‘law as product’,92 the conceptual 
boundaries of the present approach are constantly relativised and challenged by these 
parallel endeavours. 
Importantly, this multi-trajectory evolution of legal theory can be studied as a process of 
 law’s transnationalisation. Despite its prima facie appearance as being relevant 
exclusively within the nation state’s framework of legal ordering, the abovementioned 
scholarly projects in legal sociology and legal theory as well as in anthropology and 
philosophy of law are reflective of the changing environment of legal systems. This 
transformation is first and foremost perceived as one of eroding boundaries, boundaries 
between form and substance93 or between public and private94 (‘states’ and ‘markets’95), 
but is at its core concerned with the contestation, deconstruction and relativisation of 
the boundaries between law and non-law.96 At the height of the regulatory state with its 
climactical belief in juridification and in law as social engineering,97 law stares into the 
abyss of its own demise and potential irrelevance, and it is from this vantage point that 
law must be rethought and reasserted as social science, as one among other conceptual 
approaches to the study of the regulation of modern societies. 
Only against this background can we comprehend that we are bound to engage in 
studies of historical forms of legal/non-legal regulation in an ironic/paradoxical sense of law. 
In other words, references to ‘legal’ regulation are used in an aspiringly ‘watertight’ sense 
in order to demarcate one form of regulation from an alternative form of, say, 
economic regulation. At the same time, the reference to ‘legal’ regulation is of course 
based on the premise that its legal character can only be thought of as paradoxical, as a 
rejection of something opposite that needs to remain present in order for the other part to 
make any sense. The paradoxical co-existence of legal and non-legal, then, captures the 
above-described potentials of law (as oppressor or emancipator), something that 
history most often records in alternations. Craig Scott has likened the conceptual analysis 
(concerning the term ‘transnational law’) to an ‘ironic interactive space between keeping 
faith and breaking faith. Often enough, this will involve digging into a mixture of 
 inchoateness and inconsistencies in the practice or tradition and coming to grips with the 
epistemological pluralism of the field.’98 
In the concert of different approaches to the regulation of modern society, those fields 
that seem to escape a clear association with this or that regulatory approach—such as lex 
mercatoria—begin to play a crucial role in the contemporary assessment of law’s role in 
society, precisely because they challenge our understandings of the nature of legal 
regulation in fundamental ways.99 Well beyond the issue-concerned analysis of the role and 
place of lex mercatoria in the still evolving field of transnational commercial law,100 it 
became, and to a certain degree remains,101 a case in point of a larger critical and 
legalsociological inquiry into the possibilities and forms of legal regulation. Over the last two 
decades, then, the discussion of lex mercatoria, of its historical origins, its nature and 
scope has always also been an attempt to address the challenge of law by its ‘other’, by that 
which might either never become ‘law’ or is (for various reasons) not yet recognised as law, 
most likely because lex mercatoria is presented as resulting from private norm creation and 
administration and which the legal order observes as an exception or a threat.102 Against the 
background of the fast intensifying interdisciplinary theorisations of comparative law and 
legal pluralism,103 the lex mercatoria debate must also be understood primarily as a 
methodological challenge asking us to reflect on the possibility—but also the politics—of 
‘law’, which can be but need not be state-originating, which can be but need not be 
privately created or which in fact results from a complex interaction between official and 
unofficial norm creation. It is here that the real challenge of lex mercatoria as an example of 
the evolution of an ‘autonomous’ transnational legal regime104 becomes most obvious. Lex 
mercatoria offers a good insight into the complexity of the concept of transnational law, 
precisely because of its multi-layered and hybrid nature, in particular as regards the 
 interpenetration of public and private modes of norm creation and norm enforcement in 
this area. 
In the absence of world government, attempts to demarcate a legal system adequate to 
the ‘post-national constellation’105 feature, above all, a deep-running anxiety in the face 
of a perceived lack of unity, coherence and institutional and normative hierarchy.106 The 
procedural and substantive architectures of fast-emerging global regulatory regimes107 
raise questions that go to the heart of present legal-theoretical attempts to make sense of 
‘global governance’ and that many still continue to address through the lens of the state.108 
These questions arise, notably, around the ‘politics of private lawmaking’109 and as such 
concern primarily the constitutional dimensions of private ordering, that is, issues of 
accountability, legitimacy and democratic control.110 As increasingly specialised, functionally 
differentiated problem areas and spheres of human and institutional conduct evolve in 
response to a combination of external impulses and their own particular logics,111 
the law governing these constellations becomes deeply entwined in these complex, 
layered constitutions.112 The heterarchical and network dimensions of this 
functionalist evolution of law113 stand in stark contrast to the image of law as extending 
its regulatory grasp downward from the tip of a hierarchical pyramid into society: 
functionally differentiated law is forced to constantly embrace evolving institutional 
permutations114 that prove infinitely more complex and heterarchical than even 
institutional economics would have us believe.115 Like a veil, law lays itself on the surfaces 
of the shifting institutional body, and through its semi-transparent, highly lacerable 
material it makes visible, and sensitises the observer to, the anatomy of the evolving torso, 
its muscles, bones, joints, strains, injuries and lesions.116 
 
 B. Defining Law 
This image of law captures the functionalist attack on the keenly guarded bastion of legal 
formalism at the end of the nineteenth century117 as much as the horror vacui that 
eventually caught up with the process of destruction as legal scholars immersed 
themselves in empirical foundations of law, only to realise that the edifice of law was 
beginning to dissolve before their very eyes.118 The search for law in the face of its fall 
from unifying triumph into evaporation, helplessness, abuse and abolition119 inspired the 
post-World War II autopsy of positivist and natural law theories of law120 that 
eventually gave way to a radical opening of legal theory and doctrine to the diversity of 
existing social ordering systems.121 From this perspective, the evolution of law as a 
regulatory tool in the latter half of the twentieth century provides ample opportunities to 
reflect on the way in which law has been asserting itself as a reformist, emancipatory, 
empowering tool on the one hand,122 and as a deeply violent, usurping, hegemonising 
force on the other. Indeed, its conflictual nature cannot be imagined without that which 
threatens to consume and suffocate it. The sobering fate of social-reformist legal theories in 
the aftermath of the regulatory welfare state123 and, in particular, their embrace of the 
functionalist enactment of the moderating or ‘enabling state’ at the end of the century124 
should caution us against investing too much hope in law as a weapon, voice or tool of 
resistance. The turn and transformation of responsive125 and reflexive126 law programs in 
highly mature constitutional cultures into flexible regulatory programs that accompanied (and 
accommodated) a growing distrust in state regulation and political-reformist legal theory in 
the name of efficiency127 and ‘good governance’ present a formidable challenge to the post-
welfare state depictions of ‘alternatives to law’.128 At the end of the twentieth century, the 
grand narratives of social order and progress carry the stain of Eurocentrism and 
 hegemony,129 and the fate of law becomes fully caught up in this maelstrom.130 Its claim 
to authenticity becomes a matter of radical contestation as law’s aspiration to rule, guide, 
direct and control is challenged by a fast proliferating host of sites of normative orders.131 
Where does the progression of legal definitions in Table 1 leave us? Does the 
contradictory nature of the first four definitions leave the fifth as the only viable one? 
Obviously, law’s self-destruction began before globalisation.132 Globalisation, as 
alluded to in the introduction to this article, can provide a label to depict what should be 
seen as a further stage of reflection on the relationship between law and its other rather than 
as an endpoint of the possibility of law. The predominance of law’s institutionalisation 
in the Western nation state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries not only casts a 
long shadow over our present attempts to imagine law, it is also bound to make us blind 
to other, alternative approaches to political legitimacy and legal order.133 While the 
challenge of law in, or in relation to, the twentieth century welfare state is its functional 
diffusion and normative evaporation, that of the ‘new developmental state’ is a radical 
challenge to presuppositions regarding the role of the state or the meaning of public and 
private.134 To be sure, this temporalisation (‘after’ globalisation) indicates a paradigm 
shift, a conclusion and abdication of a dominant concept, rather than demarcating a 
historical development of an institutional framework that would comprehensively replace 
the preceding models of the state and modes of legal thinking.135 The importance of this 
taxonomy of models of state, models of law and legal method lies in its promise of 
providing us with a tableau of law’s evolution at least since the late eighteenth century 
into the present. But, as noted, the implied idea of progress, or even of historical 
evolution, is treacherous. While such historiography would allow us to trace the 
construction of conceptual frameworks, in our case the association of (changing) law with 
 the (changing) state, it nevertheless runs the risk of mistakenly exaggerating that very 
nexus between law and the state. That is where the third column in Table 2 (overleaf) 
becomes central: following a dialectical logic, it should here provide for the negation of 
thesis (formal law) and antithesis (substantive law). Yet, what we see is the diffusion of 
categorical boundaries that we used to refer to in order to distinguish between different 
models of state and different models of law. Western legal theory, for much of the 
twentieth century, occupied itself with the impossibility of distinguishing between ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ as a manifestation of the paradoxical foundation of law’s legitimacy with 
reference to the separation of the state and the market, of politics and economics.136 Yet it 
is this irresolvable tension between the public and the private137 that winds like a red thread 
through the evolution of models of state and law. The ‘present’—which of course is only 
perceived as such today from our particular viewpoint, but is meant as the always inherent 
potentiality of state and society in the evolution of each ideal type of the state, and which 
is depicted in the third column—might in the ‘future’ be revealed as the notyet, as an 
immodest pretension of a stage of closure. But, that we don’t know. For now, it signifies a 
moment of inability. The third column captures the impossibility of adequately rendering the 
present model of state. It gives expression to the inaptitude of applying categories of 
formal or substantive law to the proliferating sources and regulatory regimes of rule 
generation that apply to myriad social practices. 
Table 2: The Law and the State 
 
Model of 
state 
 
Rule of law 
Social state/ 
welfare state 
Enabling state, moderator state, supervision 
state/civil society, risk society, world society 
Model of law Formal Substantive Procedural 
Legal 
method 
Deduction Balancing Experimental 
 
 What Table 2 tries to capture, then, is the association of a particular model of law (formal, 
substantive, procedural) and legal methodology (deduction, balancing, experimentation) 
with a particular model of the state. This association is reflective of the tendency to 
imagine law in correlation with a historically evolving model of the state, for which we in 
the West—through the course of the twentieth century—have been crafting labels such as 
‘rule of law’, ‘welfare state’ and, into the present, ‘enabling state’. This association has been 
misleading in two ways: first, it suggests the false replacement of a ‘previous’ (eg the rule of 
law) by a ‘succeeding’ model (eg the ‘social’ or ‘welfare state’), in other words, the end of 
one model and the beginning of the next. Such a depiction is misleading in that it 
overstates the development of a maturing human rights awareness and codification/ 
institutionalisation—often associated with the emergence of the welfare state—by 
suggesting that the rule of law does not encompass such an understanding of human 
rights. What this table misrepresents, then, is the irresolvable and creative tension between 
the models of the rule of law and the welfare state (and the associated models of law and 
legal methodologies): this tension is irresolvable because formal and substantive are two 
sides of law. The depiction of law as either ‘formal’ or ‘substantive’ in association with the 
rule of law or the welfare state is thus not an expression of historical progression; rather it 
is about which understanding of law dominated (over the other) in relation to a 
particular model of the state. What the labels depict, then, is less an objective reality of a 
particular type of state and more the dominant understanding of a certain type of state 
and its law. As such, Table 2 seeks to capture the often polemical assertions in terms of 
what kind of law is possible or impossible with regard to a particular model of the state. 
The other way in which the table’s suggestion regarding models of law and state and 
respective methodologies is misleading concerns the invisibilisation of the self-referential 
 character of all three columns. Instead of depicting a clean, historical succession of 
paradigms of state and law, the table is meant to capture the present attempt, expressed in 
the third column, to make sense of already existing and competing definitions of the state, 
its law and its method. As such, the table recounts historically found, tentative 
assertions regarding the nexus between the state and the law only to show how our present 
efforts at understanding this nexus are shaped by the complex history of the association 
of different models of the state with evolving understandings of law. 
Law’s experimentation, captured in the third column of Table 2, might be an adequate 
depiction of law as parasite, of a law that has no proper method of its own and follows a 
wide-ranging variety of demands. But law’s experimentation might also be the expression of 
law in search of itself, of a law that cannot be sure of itself, its identity, its potential and 
foundations. Its stubborn self-reassertion, then, happens only from an ironical stance. 
Authority gained from the state has become a fleeting reassurance at best, considering 
the diversification and decentralisation of rule making and enforcement in modern states. 
Authority gained by an appeal to a higher order is inevitably based on the belief in a 
functioning, validating and legitimating process of interpretation, application and 
implementation. As such, issues of authority become irreversibly tied to issues of 
distribution,138 merging the ‘models’ of the rule of law and the social/welfare state into a 
paradoxical concept, whose historical appearance is merely contingent. It then becomes 
clear that what comes ‘after’ the welfare state might either be the super-welfare state or its 
demise, the neo-liberal enabling state: as models, however, they are but labels for a 
particular stage of institutional evolution. They say little if anything about the law of the 
present. 
 
  
4. PLACES AND SPACES, WHITHER LAW? 
 
With legal imagination haunted by images of a world of injustice, unequal distribution 
and grave rights abuses,139 the question becomes whether there is any room, role or even 
need for law in a globalised world. This question lies at the bottom of the current 
engagement of lawyers with global governance issues. As identified in the preceding 
section, this inquiry cannot be isolated from the struggle for law that has so far been 
identified with the state. The central thesis of this paper is that this alleged crisis of law 
and legal regulation, whether depicted as a loss of state sovereignty or as a problem of 
lacking (democratic, political) accountability140 and legitimacy,141 should instead be 
understood as a particular amplification of a fundamental problem with law. In that 
respect, it can be shown that many of our present concerns about the fate of law in relation to 
a continuing transformation of the state in relation to contemporary forces or processes of 
globalisation or transnationalisation and resulting contestations of democracy, 
legitimacy and accountability must be assessed against the background of a 
reconstruction of legal evolution in the national, local context. Without suggesting that the 
legitimacy and regulatory challenges connected with the ‘amorphous’ concept of 
global governance142 are simple restatements or mirror reflections of locally experienced 
moments of ‘exhaustion’,143 there is a particular role to be played by local, domestic 
regulatory experiences for the conceptualisation of global governance regimes. The 
discussion focusing on the role of law occupies a particularly challenging place in this 
inquiry, because the rise of globalisation is so often associated with the demise of law144 and 
with an immense pressure on law and legal institutions. Instead, globalisation can be 
 
 understood as an invitation to reflect on the connections between our attempts to make 
sense of a fragmented global, normative order and our particular, yet anything but 
homogenous, experiences with law and regulation at the national level. In short, then, 
the argument is that globalisation does not pose a first or a new advent of a ‘crisis’ of law, 
understood as a tool of regulation. Instead, the varied history of law reveals the always 
inherent combination of hubris and fragility, violence and vulnerability that underlies the 
idea and experience of law. This becomes particularly clear where transnational efforts at 
‘improving’ the legal conditions in vulnerable contexts such as labour law encounter the 
need to develop a better understanding of both the power dynamics at play between the 
norm-exporting and the norm-receiving country and the differences in the regulatory 
framework on the ground.145 
Moreover, while there is much to learn from studying law against the background of a 
particular, national, historical context,146 the transnational constellation further 
exacerbates the scope of this inquiry. Much suggests that the particular nature of the 
transnational arena defeats our attempts at understanding the relation between the 
national and the ‘post-national constellation’147 as a linear one—either on a 
chronological or a systematic level.148 But, at the same time, the evolving transnational 
nature of regulatory regimes as, for example, in corporate law149 or, again, in labour 
law,150 presents itself not as an opposition to or the negation of the possibility of extending the 
reach of legal regulation, but as a challenge to reassert the place and role of law in 
response to the thesis of law’s demise in an era of globalisation. Reconceiving law as 
transnational suggests that domestic experiences with ‘law’ are crucial reference points. 
Yet, they cannot serve as reference points of institutional or normative design, which we 
could simply ‘rediscover’ and amplify for a transposition into the transnational arena. 
 Instead, this approach must point towards two investigative strands. The first is that the 
inquiry into the evolution and, eventually, crisis of law as regulation of social activity has to 
attempt the reconstruction as an ironic project that is concerned with the meaning and 
aspiration of law as such: it is here that the positing of law is directly challenged by the 
prospect of its impossibility, by its fundamental negation. This constellation can be 
grasped as the relation or tension between law and non-law, between legality and 
legitimacy, between law and justice, society, or other.151 One strand of the ensuing inquiry is 
formed by the reconstruction of local (eg national) experiences with law as constantly 
challenged by its opposite or its foundations, embeddedness or contestations.152 
The second investigative strand is to return to the original starting point of our 
reflections on how globalisation challenges law. In this dimension we are concerned with the 
task of adequately incorporating, or perhaps only acknowledging, the gap between the 
particular context in which norms and the normative environments have evolved locally on 
the one hand, and the emerging, allegedly unruly spaces of normative order at the global 
level on the other. As indicated above, a reflection on the field of transnational law, a notion 
which Jessup offered in the 1950s to capture the hybrid regulatory space between the 
national and the international,153 should lead to its unfolding as a methodological device 
rather than to a demarcation of a more or less definable legal field. Approaching 
transnational law from a methodological perspective should help us to refrain from too 
quickly depicting the ‘transnational’ as a distinct regulatory space, which differs from the 
national and the international because of its de-territorialised scope and its hybrid, 
including mixed public-private, constitution. Instead, transnational law can be perceived as 
a particular perspective on law as part of a society, which itself cannot sufficiently be 
captured by reference to national or de-nationalised boundaries. 
 This depiction most certainly echoes a systems-theoretical understanding of a 
functionally differentiated world society where law constitutes one amongst several 
particularly coded communications. Scholars intrigued by Luhmann, who in concluding his 
seminal treatise on the ‘law of society’ famously questioned the survival of law in a 
global context,154 have followed in his footsteps by pointing to the normative evolutions 
occurring within emerging transnational regulatory regimes and have thus made a 
number of constructive suggestions to think ‘law without the state’.155 
Yet, it might be possible to push these advances even further. The attempts at 
understanding transnational law as a methodological inquiry into the nature of norms 
reconnect this inquiry with a longstanding investigation into the nature of law—and its 
contestations. The transnational dimension, then, arises not only with respect to 
territorial or jurisdictional confines, but also from the perspective of following the 
institutional modes of norm creation deep into highly specialised areas of societal activity. It 
is here that the idea of transnational law reveals its ambivalent relationship to the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’: on the one hand, transnational law appears to be embedded in and to be 
unfolding against the background of a state-centred understanding of a legal order, while on 
the other hand, the concept is connected to the longstanding and ever-increasing 
experiences of normative pluralism that sit uncomfortably with systematisations of 
law as necessarily connected to the state.156 From the point of view of systems theory, 
these differentiated ‘areas’ are constituted in functionalist terms: as the functional 
differentiation of society leads to a radical unfolding of society as world society, the 
challenge for law consists in existing and operating in a simultaneous recognition and 
disrespect vis-à-vis a known, sophisticated institutional and normative framework.157 
The current assertions, say, on this and that side of the Atlantic of a so-called ‘global’ 
 administrative or ‘general public law’ speak volumes about this challenge.158 
While this uncoupling of social systems from a state-associated framework of political, 
economic and legal order certainly presents a dramatic challenge to state-centred theories of 
law, its real gist in fact lies elsewhere. The—for lawyers—uneasy relationship between 
‘society’ and ‘world society’, between the national and the global, that is the 
transnational, should in fact not be seen as a threat but instead as an element inherent in the 
constitution of legal spaces. From this perspective, transnational refers to the ‘other’ of 
the law, which challenges but simultaneously recognises its locally learned relations to 
concrete structures of embeddedness, to particular experiences of historical evolution and 
contextual differentiation. Transnational law, then, is a way of questioning and 
reconstructing the project of law between places and spaces, where—in other words— 
places and spaces do not necessarily have to map onto territorial or geographical sub-strata 
or be divisible somehow into national or international. This perspective raises hopes for a 
realisation of the project of law, whereby law would necessarily have to be understood as 
having a recoverable, revivable emancipatory potential. But, what if that were not the 
case and questions of democratic governance would attain an endlessly hollow sound in 
a globalised world?159 What if the fragility of law would win the day, if law’s 
corruptibility would prevail over its absurdly stubborn insistence on its existence, its very 
raison d’être? 
Again, the ‘outside’ perspective of globalisation proves surprisingly helpful in further 
sharpening our investigative focus: the extremely unsure fate of social and political rights in 
transnational spaces underscores the challenge that lawyers face in pursuing law as a 
critical project in an increasingly integrated world.160 In the emerging global spaces of 
highly specialised functional societal activities, both legal and political power have fared 
 very differently from economic power. The weakness of the former in relation to the long 
undeterred success of the latter is reflected in the persistent absence of an effective global 
legal-political order. In this space, the transposition of legal instruments and concepts, 
which were developed on the domestic level, onto the level of regulating cross-border 
transactions—both public and private161—occurs as a translation exercise. Not only is 
the institutional crystallisation of the global space intimately interwoven into local 
structures while facilitating a disembedded self-regulatory, highly dynamic space, but the 
same tension between place and space repeats itself with regard to the normative 
dimension.162 
 
5. THINGS WE LOST? 
 
The preceding observations point to an assessment of things we (allegedly) lost as a 
layered account that is informed by a double perspective on legal memory. One story of 
loss is directly linked to the difficulties of translating both institutions and concepts from the 
national to the transnational level. This well-known story, however, is quite 
misleading, in the sense that it renders invisible the inherent fragility of law that has always 
been there and that thus existed ‘before’ globalisation.163 The already noted laments 
concerning the alleged erosions of sovereignty, of legal hierarchy and unity, of democracy 
and legitimacy, that are seen in close connection to the state’s loss of regulatory ability in 
particular to govern transnational activities, can now be read as a reversal of what has 
been a longstanding critical stance towards law. The depiction of an allegedly external 
influence, sub verbo globalisation, which is exerted on nation states to subdue national 
governments and political actors from the outside by offsetting previously existing 
 institutional and normative arrangements obscures the degree to which all such 
arrangements had always been contestable and fragile from the beginning.164 Reminding us 
of Martti Koskenniemi’s depiction of the reversal of emergency and normal in the 
justificatory debates over the Kosovo intervention,165 the image of globalisation as threat to 
the sovereignty of the state and the unity of law washes over the highly contested 
grounds on which the two have always been resting.166 In order to explore this contention 
further, the next section briefly ties the current investigations about the fate of law in the 
transnational context back to the critique levelled against the regulatory state during the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 
A. Law as Non-Law 
Current research into the breathtaking development of transnational regulatory regimes 
prompts intriguing parallels to previous inquiries into the driving forces of legal regulation, 
in particular the development of ‘legal pluralism’ and ‘law and society’ in the 1970s and 
1980s. For one, legal pluralists and law and society scholars crucially contributed to a better 
understanding of the ‘semi-autonomous’ nature of legal fields: as pioneered in Sally Falk 
Moore’s analysis of law in her 1976 article,167 law is understood as constituted in part by 
social norms, routines, customs and practices, and in part by hard legal regulation. The 
ensuing notion of law as a semi-autonomous field proved to be vitally important in 
opening our eyes to the intricate relations between the regulator and concrete, local, 
intimate social spaces.168 Furthermore, striving for alternatives to the at times heavy-handed 
social engineering by the legal machinery, scholars called for extralegal activism169 and 
delegalisation.170 
 Such a growing understanding of the tensions between ‘lifeworld and system’,171 ‘the 
raw and the cooked’,172 or ‘core and periphery’173 would soon become instrumental in the 
critical assessment of the role of legal regulation in a highly pluralistic society during the 
middle of the twentieth century, which until then had remained very much within the 
intellectual and conceptual confines of Max Weber’s distinction between substantive and 
formal rationalities of law.174 In his astute analysis of law’s evolution from substantive to 
formal rationality along with the emergence of the bureaucratic rule of law, Weber had 
identified on the one hand the stabilising role of law for the conduct of commercial (and 
other) affairs, while, on the other, he had emphasised the potentially harmful effects of 
ever-recurring anti-formal tendencies on the body and practice of law.175 Weber’s 
sensibility to the contestations—the anti-rational, material challenges—to the aspiringly 
formal edifice of law176 turned out to foretell the ensuing evolution of legal regulation well 
into the highly sophisticated regulatory architectures of Western welfare states,177 plagued by 
a purposive and intentional regulatory overdrive.178 It comes as no surprise, then, that the 
reflection on the place of law in a canon of voices of social ordering that lawyers and social 
theorists in North America were concerned with,179 was somewhat echoed by the critique of 
‘instrumental’ and ‘regulatory’ law in an overly zealous welfare state apparatus in Western 
Europe.180 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the responses to the financially and normatively 
exhausted welfare state181 soon split into progressive182 and conservative183 camps. This 
context is worth bearing in mind when assessing today’s academic and political proposals in 
the wake of the financial crisis. In the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which saw 
a far-reaching crumbling of social-democratic policy and a growing scepticism for 
Keynesian economics, a fairly ambitious theoretical proposal was made that aimed to 
 
 resituate law in a more accentuated model of society: in this model, which did not lend 
itself to a straightforward ideological appropriation, society is composed of intersecting, but 
separate, communications that are each constituted by a distinct terminology (‘code’). Law 
was to be understood as one of these social systems—along with the ‘economy’, and with 
‘politics’, ‘religion’ and ‘art’.184 On this basis, the concept of ‘reflexive law’ was 
proposed as a form of law marked above all by a crucial exposure to and immersion in its 
surrounding systems, while it simultaneously remained ‘operationally’ closed. Due to its 
‘cognitive’ openness, however, law must constantly receive impulses (or ‘irritations’) and, 
relying on its autopoietic nature, formulate legal responses—ie continue its 
systematic operation—in the context of a constantly changing environment. In the face of 
the weakening welfare state and the growing frustration with ineffective, undemocratic, over-
generalising and paternalising regulatory laws,185 the concept of reflexive law was offered 
to explain the particular challenge and form of legal regulation in a complex world. Its 
contested186 core consisted of understanding law as being taken out of a learned institutional 
context made up of official institutions authoritatively creating stateoriginated laws, 
and instead being forced to reassert itself in highly diversified complex environments. This 
radicalisation of law’s functional orientation constituted a new stage in the assessment of 
law’s institutional form, as it has been learned over time. Whereas law is still today most 
often associated with the state, already the legal sociological work at the turn of the century 
as well as the legal pluralist work since the 1960s and 1970s had long questioned the law-
state nexus. 
 
B. The Amnesia of Transnational Regulation 
 But reflexive law came at a price, as its methodological orientation turned out to be highly 
attractive to those who wanted to deconstruct the state in the interest of market 
liberalisation. The turn away from the state and to the market at the end of the twentieth 
century can be seen as smartly employing the very methodological orientations that had 
informed the reconstructive legal projects in the face of a financially and normatively 
exhausted welfare state187 in the 1980s. The fragile reconstructions of law through the 
concepts of responsive or reflexive law on both sides of the Atlantic eventually fed into a 
large-scale rejection of state ‘intervention’ throughout the 1980s and 1990s. When 
politically progressive scholars in the 1970s and 1980s had turned to alternative modes of 
legal regulation seeking to translate law’s generality into contextual, learning-oriented 
forms of socio-legal regulation, they had hoped to save the political ambitions of the 
welfare state, while continuing the socio-political debate over the substance and direction of 
political intervention.188 In contrast, both today’s neo-formalism and today’s 
neofunctionalism threaten to cut the ties between the current quest to answer the challenges 
of globalisation and the previous struggles over law and politics. Its proponents 
characterise legal regulation as inappropriately policy-driven and as an undue infringement 
on societal actors’ capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously.189 Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos aptly captured this development in the following observation: ‘In a model 
based on privatization, private initiative and market supremacy, the principles of order, 
reliability, and trust cannot be commanded by the state. They can only come from the law 
and the judicial system, as a set of independent and universal systems which create standard 
expectations and resolve litigation through legal frameworks which are presumed to be 
understood by everyone.’190 
With the renaissance of neo-formalism and neo-functionalism, which have 
 characterised legal policy in recent years, a heavy reliance on arguments of ‘necessity’, 
‘objectivity’ and ‘naturalness’ came to prepare the ground for a functionalist 
interpretation and application of legal norms in politically charged contexts experiencing 
fundamental shifts from public to private regulation. The attack on contract adjudication 
and governmental ‘intervention’ that accompanied these developments regularly rested on 
an understanding of the market as a-political, a-historic and quasi-natural.191 This 
depiction of the market and the state as separate worlds formed troubling alliances with 
policy recommendations promoting the privatisation of public services that were often 
fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost reduction.192 Yet whether or not, and in what 
forms, private actors assume formerly public regulatory functions, represents the outcome of 
political choices and of other socio-economic developments at both the national and 
transnational level.193 The allegedly available ‘fresh start’ for societal self-regulation 
without state interference—at least as it was widely perceived until the outbreak of the 
2007 financial crisis—stood in stark contrast to the observations made many decades 
ago, that when market actors are enabled and empowered to exercise their private 
autonomy they are exercising this freedom based on public deliberation and consensus.194 
While there is considerable reason to believe, today, that we have entered a stage in the 
assessment of state and market where we have to carefully turn our attention again to the 
long and winding history of this relationship (between state and market),195 the 
identification of starting points for a reconstructive project is far from obvious.196 As the 
treacherous denationalisation197 of regulatory areas continues to pose tremendous 
conceptual problems for state-based theories of law, we must aim to combine our 
methodological inquiry into the nature of transnational law with a bold reconstruction of 
critical perspectives from which to discuss the need for ‘better’, ‘more efficient’, 
 ‘tougher’ etc regulation, that is needed today in the face of what continues to unfold as a 
dramatic financial and economic crisis. 
 
C. Transnational Governance Regimes as Cases in Point of Post-Regulatory Law 
As is evidenced for example by the case of corporate governance regulation, many of 
today’s regulatory regimes are irreversibly transnational and hybrid in nature.198 While we 
continue to study them through nationally oriented textbooks and case law, we soon learn 
that the rules and instruments we are dealing with are products of a far-reaching, 
fundamental transformation of the regulatory landscape.199 As corporate law is being 
shaped by a complex mix of public, private, state-based and non-state-based norms, 
principles and rules, generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of actors200 
and experts,201 even the most casual glance at today’s corporate governance debates 
reveals two important aspects. One is the way in which the analysis of contemporary 
corporate governance regulation can help us to become sensitive to the emerging, new 
framework within which corporate governance rules are evolving, a framework which is 
constituted by a combination of local and transnational actors and norms, connected 
through ‘networks’ and migrating standards.202 As reflected in the further expanding 
research on transnational regulatory areas,203 the high degree of technicality of the 
regulatory subjects and the crucial role of expert committees in drafting applicable norms at 
considerable distance from formal legislative processes204 present a formidable 
challenge to traditional, regulatory theories of law.205 
As we begin to understand the emerging regulatory frameworks in highly specialised 
areas as an illustration of contemporary rule-making, we can appreciate the legal pluralist 
 deconstruction of formal and informal legal orders in a new light. Building, on the one 
hand, on early legal-sociological work by Ehrlich (‘living law’) and Gurvitch (‘social law’), 
we are prompted to revisit the core question of any sociology of law, namely how ‘to 
investigate the correlations between law and other spheres of society’.206 Expanding the 
spectrum, on the other hand, with a view to legal pluralist work by scholars like Moore,207 
Galanter,208 Macaulay,209 Santos210 and Teubner,211 contemporary assessments of ‘hybrid 
legal spaces’212 that are not sufficiently captured by references to local or national contexts 
might help us understand better the references to a distinctly transnational emergence of 
regulatory regimes. Again, this reading of ‘transnational’ allows us to study such regimes not 
as entirely detached from national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of and 
reaching beyond them.213 As alluded to above, the transnational dimension of new actors 
and newly emerging forms of norms would be able to radicalise their 
‘semiautonomous’ nature (Moore) in the following way: we would conceive of 
regulatory spaces as being marked by a dynamic and often problematically instrumentalised 
tension between formal and informal norm-making processes. 
But, in contrast to the ever more refined sociological perspective on this evolving 
transnational regulatory landscape, the question of politics must continue to linger 
painfully.214 Again, an example taken from the corporate law context may serve as an 
illustration. The much lamented regulatory ‘failure’ of traditional, state-based 
legalpolitical intervention into multinational corporations has long served as an argument 
for the need to develop either distinctly ‘post-national’, institutionalised governance 
forms or to further strengthen the grip of self-regulatory and soft instruments with only 
voluntary binding nature.215 Mirroring the complex, hard-to-navigate landscape of border-
crossing corporate activity, the proposed conceptual approaches vary greatly as to their 
 reliance on self-regulation, market-based reputational enforcement and traditional statutory 
intervention. Constituting anything but a coherent set of applicable approaches to corporate 
regulation, they range from references to ‘global jurisdiction’216 to the 
reconceptualisation of ‘torture as tort’ and the elaboration of transnational civil human 
rights litigation.217 Closely connected to this, there have been wide-ranging efforts to 
further build on scandalisation instruments that include global shaming.218 Finally, the 
increased if not resigned reliance on soft law instruments, self-binding norms, and codes of 
conduct and best practice,219 altogether suggests an irreversible trend away from 
‘government’, towards ‘governance’.220 
As transnational governance regimes, then, fields such as corporate governance, 
labour law,221 capital market law, contract law in general and consumer protection law in 
particular222 are increasingly marked by the existence of opt-out clauses and self-regulation 
mechanisms rather than enforceable hard-law rules.223 Does this mean that the legal 
pluralist depiction of regulatory spheres as ‘semi-autonomous fields’224 is no longer able 
to provide a sufficient starting point for a more comprehensive critique of the existing 
machinery of justice?225 Does the radical fragmentation of transnational law today imply that 
the original legal pluralist sword is too blunt to cut through the distinctly post-national 
constellation of regulatory regimes? The opposite is true: legal pluralism can forcefully build 
on its learned lessons in the aftermath of the decaying welfare state and ‘legal 
centralism’. Whilst unable to translate directly the insights gained in those contexts onto the 
transnational sphere, they can nevertheless assist in depicting the multifaceted nature of 
transnational governance. This becomes particularly evident where, in a context such as an 
evolving political governance system such as in Europe, claims about ‘private autonomy’ 
and ‘market freedom’ are advanced226 that seem to echo many of the previous contestations 
 of market intervention and judicial activism within the nation state.227 Our renewed interest 
in different meanings of embedded markets is of crucial importance at a time when the 
financialist paradigm seems to have outrun itself and where, in our search for a new basis 
and framework for public policy228 in a highly interconnected transnational regulatory, 
post welfare-state era, we cannot simply return to ‘more state, less market’ formulas. 
The crucial contribution of a legal pluralist analysis lies in its rendering the boundaries 
between the state and the market qualitative rather than quantitative. The central 
question is not whether there is a need for more or less state (or market), but rather what is at 
stake in making references to either. 
Table 3: Law as Non-Law—Transnational Legal Pluralism 
 
  
 
Table 3 picks up this line of thought and ties it back to the narrative of loss (of legal unity, 
certainty and hierarchy) that we encountered at the beginning of this article. While the 
idea of loss only makes sense when we both idealise and immunise law in the nation state 
against its inherent ‘other’, the consequence of realising that we must think of law as the 
inseparability of law/non-law is a breaking down of the horizontal boundaries between 
‘national’ and ‘global’ law. Just as the boundary between law and non-law emerges as 
paradoxical, the dividing line between the national and the global is not one governed by 
jurisdiction. It is, instead, one that relies on a critical reconstruction of the project of 
law—and, as noted earlier, we embrace ‘transnational law’ as a methodological project on 
the very nature of normativity generally and law more particularly. The much alleged 
impossibility of law on a global scale must become the invitation to revitalise the legal 
pluralist project of questioning what is at stake when we differentiate between law and 
non-law. This is the defining inquiry into the nature of transnational governance. 
 
6. THE ARGUMENT FOR TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
As Saskia Sassen has recently reiterated, dryly and irrefutably, there is an intimate 
connection between the search for and the critique of law and the nation state.229 Her 
observation is particularly astute as Sassen has, over the years,230 contributed much to our 
understanding of how the allegedly external, victimising state of ‘globalisation’ is 
distinctly co-evolving with and produced, constructed and conceived within the 
‘national’. Instead of positing globalisation as a process, event or development that 
 overwhelms nation states, national economies and domestic political processes to haunt, 
discipline and submerge them, Sassen’s depiction—like Santos’231—points back to the 
nation state and to sub-national spheres of societal activity and decision-making. It is 
within these spheres that elements of physical and intellectual texture emerge and coalesce to 
produce border-crossing ‘global assemblages’. These constitute distinct spheres that, 
famously fuelled by, inter alia, the dramatic development of information technology and 
other ‘transnational social and cultural practices’ such as human rights, nationality and 
residence rights as well as intellectual property rights,232 integrate territorial and 
deterritorial, vertical and horizontal ordering patterns to produce a structured regime of 
societal activities.233 
Sassen’s concept of ‘global assemblages’ constitutes a fruitful contribution to our 
understanding of globalisation as a challenge to study the dramatic transformation of 
institutional and semantic structures in an era of intensifying transnational communication 
and governance regimes. 
Sassen’s idea of global assemblages allows us to structure the sphere between the 
national and the international/global that has been plaguing the legal imagination for 
some time now.234 Her main contribution can be seen in her unerring commitment to 
simultaneously emphasise and relativise the national in the emerging cartography of a 
globalised world. Sassen’s emphasis on the national and sub-national, viz local, processes 
and institutions goes a long way toward allowing us to identify the concrete places at 
which decisions that result in globalisation phenomena are prepared, taken and 
implemented. Her work on global cities is of particular relevance in this regard. Here, 
Sassen has been arguing convincingly that global cities gain autonomy from their local 
environments both by adapting real-time collaborative and networking capacities with 
 other cities and operative centres and by successfully demanding and implementing a 
facilitating, supportive infrastructure (electricity, broadband, digitisation, 24/7 service, 
access and maintenance).235 At the same time, for Sassen, the depiction of the particular 
‘embeddedness’ of the global city in a local environment only makes sense in connection 
with an appreciation of the particular spaces that open up in and between these concrete 
cities as places. Highlighting in particular the crucial role played by the breathtaking 
advances in information technology that fuel the space-time compression through realtime 
collaboration, connection, and linking of formerly distant places, actors and centres, Sassen, 
then as now,236 recognises the central challenge that these changes pose for the 
‘effectiveness of current framings for state authority and democratic participation’.237 
Spaces in Sassen’s understanding, then, are not to be mistaken with territorially or 
geographically defined ‘areas’, but constitute much more ambiguous realms that are 
constituted through societal interaction as well as through intellectual construction. Examples 
include ‘global cities and transboundary publics’238 but also global capital markets,239 
which illustrate how the triad of ‘territory, authority, rights’ is inescapably subjected to 
increasingly denationalised processes of deassembling and reassembling.240 The 
relativisation of the national basis of globalisation in Sassen’s work proceeds in relation to 
the well-known institutions, reference points and established procedures such as states, 
parliaments, administrative agencies and, importantly, courts. These institutions have long 
structured the economic, political and legal order and are now struggling to reassert their 
previously held roles and positions of power.241 This—relative—relativisation of the national 
feeds into the formation of a newly emerging spatial category: the focus on space promises 
to capture more adequately the way in which our understanding of regulatory landscapes 
as well as of scopes of human interactions still reckons with concretely identifiable 
 places of legal and political regulation while at the same time reaching beyond it. While 
the latter is aptly depicted in both Sassen’s and Santos’ analysis of the interaction between 
the national and the global, the former has been given a powerful expression by David 
Levi-Faur’s concept of ‘regulatory capitalism’.242 This constellation presents 
tremendous challenges to both an analytical and a prescriptive framework that was 
developed with reference to a more or less well defined, territorially confined and 
institutionally close-knit regulatory framework.243 To be sure, one challenge of this embrace 
of space consists in developing an appropriate language with which to communicate about 
the institutional and normative challenges in a world that cannot effectively be governed 
through domestic and domestically minded rules.244 The other challenge arises from the 
intricate nature of the spaces unfolding in the transnational realm. Part of the reason for 
the Washington Consensus’ effectiveness in streamlining— literally on a global scale—
regulatory politics, has to be seen in the particular connections and interdependencies that 
were created between, say, corporate, tax, labour, financial and social regulation. Bound to 
upset and to undermine fragile balances between different social interests, the deregulation of 
corporate, commercial and financial activity gave rise to an overwhelming amount of new 
regulatory institutions and instruments,245 all the while promoting a principle of ‘good 
governance’ marked by minimum state intervention into allegedly self-regulating markets. 
Among the primary victims, surely, was and remains labour, as regards both the 
differently institutionalised forms of workers’ protection, industrial relations and 
collective bargaining and the sobering erosion of basically all forms of employment 
security. A far cry from Polanyi’s succinct critique of Speenhamland246 and Arendt’s 
meditations on the transformation of the worker into a political actor,247 the rise of the 
‘precariat’248 has been accompanied by an across-theboard undermining of both 
 institutional and individual frameworks of workers’ rights.249 Conceptual approaches such as 
democratic experimentalism,250 regulatory capitalism and transnational labour citizenship251 
constitute attempts to develop an appropriately designed framework of legal analysis and 
regulation in light of a radically disembedded regulatory landscape. 
The above can be seen as one among many examples that illustrate how the 
specifically European Post-Westphalian legal perspective, which predominantly rested on an 
understanding of a hierarchically structured system of order,252 has, within the 
confines of the nation state and later in light of a fast-proliferating realm of 
bordercrossing hybrid regulatory activity, been put on the defensive. Much in the 
present discussions about the fate of law in an era of globalisation is oriented around the 
form, nature and quality of a global legal order.253 Yet, as captured in Table 3, such 
investigations remain for the most part confined to an analysis on the left-hand side of 
the matrix, namely to an exercise in contrasting the presently perceived absence of 
reliable legal institutions and instruments on the global scale with an allegedly perished 
state of legal certainty, hierarchy of norms and the unity of law within the nation state. It is 
only when we care to remember the description of the legal order from a legal pluralist point 
of view that the fundamental fragility of the supposedly stable and unified legal system 
becomes once more apparent. Once we revisit the pluralist contestation of law’s exclusivity 
and its alleged hierarchical supremacy within the nation state, we begin to see the transition 
from a nation state-based understanding of law towards one of ‘global law’ as a 
continuation— rather than a loss—of a theoretical investigation into the meaning of 
law and legal ordering. It is this perspective that should drive lawyers’ interest in the 
present musings about ‘space’. 
The lawyer struggling to understand the fate of her field in a world of transition from 
 national to global is bound to engage in a both methodological and theoretical inquiry. It 
is methodological in the sense that legal concepts are competing with alternative 
disciplinary approaches to effectively address the regulatory challenges and goals arising 
from ‘global governance’. It is theoretical in the sense that the widely observable 
proliferation of norm creation and norm administration in numerous areas of what legal 
scholars and political scientists have been coining ‘private transnational regulation’254 
prompts a revisiting of the ‘concept’ of law. But, in addition, the claims laid to this space are 
fiercely driven by political, religious, cultural and ‘social’ critique. What is at stake in fact is 
less an answer to the question whether or not the norms in question are law. Such questions 
were relatively easily posed—and answered—in the context of the fairly differentiated 
legal systems of Western welfare states, in which distinctions between public and private 
ordering could usually be drawn by reference either to the larger societal interest in 
question or to the institutional affiliation of the norm’s author, in other words the 
‘authority’ of the norm entrepreneur. In the transnational space, this institutional 
framework is being fundamentally reshaped. The constitutional order, on the basis of 
which it was possible in Western nation states to constantly scrutinise and redraw the 
boundaries between public and private regulatory activity, is largely absent in the 
transnational space. Instead, process-oriented principles such as accountability and 
transparency are mobilised and implemented in a vast array of transnational norm creations 
in order to fill this void. At the heart of such attempts—as in the ‘Global 
Administrative Law’ project—is the struggle over a new foundation of legitimacy. Again, 
moving out of the highly regulated space of the nation state, the struggle over legitimacy 
becomes one of deep-running conflicts and the various competing attempts to solve them. As 
such, for lawyers and their field, the reference to ‘space’ is first and foremost a reminder of 
 the fragility of their conceptual framework and their regulatory instruments. 
What, then, follows from this constellation for the lawyer and legal theory? Included in 
the resulting task for the lawyer in her quest to reassess the nature of global legal 
regulation is the need to scrutinise and explore both the obvious and the not so obvious 
differences between law and competing regulatory approaches that are on offer in a 
globalising world, for example, from economics, religion and ‘culture’. The lawyer will 
tend to distinguish her project from those competitors in both formal and substantive 
dimensions. As regards form, the primary mark of distinction that she will resort to is 
hierarchy, for what sustains the typical lawyer is the belief in a system of social order that is 
built on a model of legitimate authorisation, on which are based rules of norm creation, 
implementation and enforcement.255 In terms of substance, the demarcation between 
law and alternative forms of social order can be drawn with reference to the centrality of 
‘justice’ to the legal system. Yet, it soon becomes clear that the self-referentiality of justice in 
the legal system256 is echoed and paralleled by similar, even if differently labelled, 
selfreferences in other systems. Law’s claim to be the sole guardian of really any concept of 
justice, in other words of justice ‘per se’, cannot in the end escape its deconstruction as 
pure semantics. 
Law’s relativisation, then, in the concert of differently conceived ‘governance’ models, is 
a sobering prospect. At the same time, it is one that seems distressingly compatible with the 
long-triumphant neo-liberal assertions of law’s role in facilitating global market 
activity and universal freedom—from, say, state intervention. If law were really not more 
than a different label for ‘good governance’, it would indeed have little if anything to add to 
the current investigations into the consequences of globalisation. That is why the lower 
right-hand corner of the matrix in Table 3 becomes an important final step in the attempt to 
 picture the nature and fate of law in our time. This part of the matrix depicts the global 
illustrations of the contestation of legal order and of its claims to supremacy, hierarchy, 
unity and universality. The decisive step in making sense of the matrix now is to ask how we 
must understand the boundary between the inherently contestable, amorphous, 
incoherent and not fully articulable principles, rules and instruments that emerge here, 
and ‘law’. In other words, how can concepts such as ‘transnational labour citizenship’, 
‘global civil society’ and ‘global administrative law’ become integral components of a 
global order, which we would justly refer to as a legal order? 
The answer lies in the connection between the upper and the lower parts of the righthand 
corner of the matrix. At the level of the nation state, we saw the dissolution of the vertical 
boundary between ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ as a result of understanding that none of the 
principles, rules, instruments or institutions associated with law (the upper left-hand corner 
of the matrix) would exist without the ‘other’, without the contestation, constant 
undermining and challenge of the existing system of ‘law’. Two steps remain: the first is 
that when we apply this logic to the lower side of the matrix through which we try to 
depict the ‘global’ scale of law, it becomes apparent that the vertical boundary between 
‘law’ and ‘non-law’ must cease, as it, too, is a misrepresentation of the reciprocal 
interdependency of the right and left sides of the divide. Indeed, the very fluid character of 
emerging global ‘legal’ institutions must occur in face of the fundamental challenge and 
contestation of all that is not or not yet law. 
The last step: now with the dividing line between ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ on both the 
national and the global levels revealed as a paradoxical boundary between two opposites 
which can neither be separated nor become one, we are left with the remaining divider 
between the national and the global. The nature of that divide has itself, however, become 
 deeply questionable as well. One of its main justifications, namely law’s close association 
with the state, has been challenged to the degree that legal pluralism has opened our eyes to 
a host of normative orders and contexts of legal ordering with forms of 
institutionalisation that do not fit into the dualist model of state and society. Moreover, 
legal fields that lawyers had identified and scrutinised within the confines of the nation 
state have—in following the logic of the societal areas prompting legal regulation—been 
burgeoning ‘outward’, as it were, driven by the claim to ‘extend’ their regulatory reach to 
border-crossing and, indeed, global events and activities. But, with law following the 
rationality of societal differentiation, the image of law’s outbound journey into a world of 
global meaning is misleading. This journey could just as well be described as an 
inbound one, as an exploration that unfolds along the extremely fine capillaries of a 
convulsing body of society into its deepest inner parts and, there, asserts its logic of ‘legal’ 
and ‘illegal’. In light of influential images of a ‘shrinking world’,257 globally spanning 
migration flows,258 media coverage of formerly distant events and concerns259 and a 
deafening expansion of a global culture,260 it is often perceived that the law has in fact been 
under pressure to travel ‘beyond’ the boundaries of the nation state, to assert and to regain its 
regulatory power in an otherwise unruly global world. And in fact, developments under the 
label of legal globalisation have taken on a wide range of forms, from local courts 
claiming ‘universal’ jurisdiction261 to the development of behaviour-guiding norms in 
the form of codes of conduct, best practice guidelines and recommendations, which can 
themselves no longer be conceived of as either public or private, national or international 
law. 
It is this diffusion of normative orders in the form of proliferating norm producers 
and enforcement schemes that seriously calls into question the dividing line between a 
 national and a global level of lawmaking. Indeed, as mentioned above, many of today’s 
regulatory regimes combine public and private, direct and indirect forms of norm 
creation and administration. These ‘transnational law regimes’262 emerge, on the one 
hand, through actors who derive their lawmaking power not necessarily or exclusively 
from politically and formally institutionalised hierarchies but increasingly from 
selflegitimating, issue or problem-area driven processes of norm production, and from a 
global flow of normative principles, institutional initiatives, ‘migrating principles’263 and 
norms, on the other. 
The central argument to be made here is that we must conceive of this transformation 
and erosion of the vertical (law/non-law) and horizontal (national/global) boundaries as a 
methodological inquiry into the way in which spaces of legal order are being defined. The 
legal pluralist project of the twentieth century in many ways opened the door to a harsh, 
often very empirically based, critique of the shortcomings and blindspots of existing, 
formally institutionalised legal cultures. The legal pluralists pushed for a 
theorisation that involved applying legal sociological insights gained in foreign, often 
indigenous, legal cultures to domestic rule of law systems, eventually paving the way for a 
tremendously rich series of investigations into the inner and outer worlds of different 
legal cultures.264 The present state of research on ‘law and globalisation’ suggests that the 
demarcation of national and global forms of law today is as much a methodological (and 
critical) enterprise as the legal pluralist deconstruction of legal hierarchy and unity of 
law was then. 
Transnational law is another name for transnational legal pluralism, for an (inherently 
interdisciplinary) inquiry into the nature of legal regulation of problems, which have long 
been extending beyond the confines of jurisdiction. Such regulatory challenges both 
 ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the nation state,265 have always been at the heart of the 
sociolegal orientation of the legal pluralist inquiry into the myriad contexts, forms 
and dynamics of norm creation.266 But, as the transnational legal pluralist project 
takes seriously the functional differentiation of a society in search of its law, it is bound 
to suggest and to explore connections between the law/non-law collisions then and now, 
and between those here and those ‘out there’. And so, in trying to make sense of the 
changing frameworks of legal regulation for global human conduct and societal 
development, the transnational legal pluralist is bound to revisit former instances of legal 
realism, anti-formalism, functionalism, deconstruction and ‘political legal theory’. But 
the insights and lessons to be gained from this reconstruction are both limited and risky. 
Too often will the learned understandings of ‘rights’, of hierarchy or equality make the 
pluralist blind to the particular dynamics that govern a normative field.267 In response, 
transnational legal pluralism as a methodology implies a radical unfolding of the tension 
between the four different parts of the matrix. The law of a highly differentiated world 
society can neither be based on the rigid separation of law and non-law nor on a 
distinction between national and global. Instead, the transnational legal pluralist project 
highlights the evolution of legal categories that can generate order under circumstances 
where the traditional institutional framework and reference sets have to be seen as 
contingent. Such an evolution is part of a process of contending forces and dynamics 
with unpredictable outcomes. Existing and emerging research on regulatory regimes and 
regulatory governance as umbrella concepts for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of 
law and regulation points to the need to better connect seemingly disparate research and 
policy agendas. There are important parallels between, say, the legal pluralist critique of 
regulatory law on the one hand and investigations in economic sociology into the 
 evolving nature of the embeddedness of markets on the other.268 
Other parallels exist between the progressive methodological orientation of 
responsive/reflexive law in the 1970s and 1980s and ‘cosmopolitanism’ today269 and the 
recent, politically much more ambivalent interest in ‘social norms’.270 For each of these 
inquiries, a first task consists of continuing or opening and pursuing dialogues between 
law and economics, law and sociology, law and anthropology, law and political economy. A 
second task consists of effectively connecting the domestically unfolded critique of law 
under various guises—notably, those of legal realism, critical legal studies, law and 
economics, feminist legal studies or critical race theory, postcolonialism or Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), of responsive, reflexive law, as well as social 
norms—with, say, current debates around global governance, ‘global administrative law’, 
regulatory networks or transnational law. While we are not coming to such an analysis 
without baggage, the challenge remains how best to apply the things learned and the 
things discovered in the face of an extremely pluralistic and contested landscape. 
Beginning with neither taking law for granted nor mourning its death might provide a 
promising starting point for an analysis of legal regulation and its alternatives in a 
changing world. 
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